







“Auction Design with Approximate Common Prior” 
 
Hien Pham and Takuro Yamashita 
 
 
November 2021  
 
Auction Design with Approximate Common Prior*
Hien Pham Takuro Yamashita
September 26, 2021
Abstract
We consider an auction design problem with private values which are dis-
tributed in a possibly correlated way. Both the seller and bidders do not know
the true distribution, but (perhaps based on the data about past auctions),
each of them has some “benchmark” distribution in mind. They face “local”
uncertainty in the sense that their benchmark distributions are “ε-close” to
each other and to the true distribution, and this itself is common knowledge.
We show that, no matter how small (but positive) is ε (i.e., except for an ex-
act common prior case), the worst-case-minded seller finds it optimal to offer
a dominant-strategy mechanism. With an appropriate transfer reduction, we
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show that, as ε vanishes, the seller’s expected revenue converges to the ex-
pected revenue in the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism with ε = 0 (i.e.,
with an exact common prior), but not to the expected revenue in the optimal
Bayesian mechanism with ε = 0.
1 Introduction
In auction design, it has been a standard assumption that the joint distribution of the
bidders’ values is common knowledge across the bidders (and often also the seller).
One situation where the above common prior assumption may seem reasonable is
when there has been many similar auctions so that everyone has a good amount of
information about how the values are distributed. Online auctions of standardized
products and repeated public procurement auctions may be candidate examples.
Although it is impossible that everyone literally shares the exact same belief, it can
possibly be the case that everyone’s prior belief about the joint value distribution
becomes close to each other, and that closeness can be common knowledge. For
example, see Cripps, Ely, Mailath, and Samuelson (2008).
In this paper, we study if this “approximate” common knowledge would be a
good justification for the seller to use the optimal Bayesian mechanism assuming an
“exact” common-knowledge prior. More precisely, we consider a standard private-
value auction setting, except that the true joint distribution over the values is only
approximately common knowledge in the sense that (i) the seller and each bidder has
his own “candidate” joint distribution (for example, each of them estimates a joint
distribution based on the data available to him), and (ii) it is common knowledge
that they are “ε-close” to each other, but (iii) any information structure that is
consistent with (i) and (ii) is potentially possible. Our question is whether there
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exists a sequence of mechanisms and their associated Bayesian equilibrium where, as
ε vanishes, the expected revenue converges to the one under the optimal Bayesian
mechanism with the exact common prior. If it is not possible, then we would argue
that the exact common prior auction model lacks its justification as a limit of large-
data approximation.
Indeed, we show that, under certain regularity conditions, the best expected
revenue in the limit is the expected revenue under the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism with ε = 0, that is, in case the seller knows the correct joint distribution
but does not assume the same knowledge for the buyers.
In case the true joint distribution exhibits independence, Myerson (1981) shows
that the optimal Bayesian mechanism with common knowledge of the true joint
distribution is dominant-strategy incentive compatible. Our result says that, in
this case, approximate common knowledge and exact common knowledge are indeed
“close” in terms of the optimal mechanism and its achieving revenue. This part
may be seen as a generalization of Madarász and Prat (2017) to a multi-agent,
independent-private-value, and single-crossing environment.
In the correlated environment, the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism can be
very different from the optimal Bayesian mechanism with exact common knowledge:
the former lets the agents earn some information rent (see Segal (2003) and Chung
and Ely (2007)), while the latter typically achieves full surplus extraction (see Crémer
and McLean (1988)). Chung and Ely (2007) show that, if the seller has no idea about
the agents’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs, and hence their beliefs can be potentially
very different from the seller’s benchmark joint distribution, then the worst-case-
minded seller may find it optimal to offer a dominant-strategy mechanism. Indeed,
the agents’ interim beliefs considered in Chung and Ely (2007) must be inconsistent
with the seller’s benchmark distribution, in the sense that no common prior type
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space can generate those beliefs.
Hence, a natural question is how much uncertainty the seller must enjoy in or-
der for him to offer a dominant-strategy mechanism (by, for example, thinking it is
possible that the buyers’ interim beliefs could be as in Chung and Ely (2007)). Our
result shows that we only need arbitrarily small “ε-uncertainty” (in the appropriate
sense defined later). That is, for any ε > 0, as long as the seller worries about the
possibility that his benchmark distribution is ε-different from the true distribution
over values and from what each bidder believes, the worst-case-minded seller would
find it optimal to offer a dominant-strategy mechanism (even if his benchmark dis-
tribution exhibits correlation as in Crémer and McLean (1988)). In this sense, only
a small seed of uncertainty suffices for the result of Chung and Ely (2007) to be
relevant.1 Of course, whether our notion of closeness is the right notion may call
for judgment, we believe that our results contributes to better understanding of this
important question.
1.1 Related literature
The common prior assumption in mechanism design has been challenged by many
papers in the robust mechanism design literature (see, for example, Bergemann and
Morris (2005), Chung and Ely (2007), Chen and Li (2017), and Yamashita and
Zhu (forthcoming) as the most relevant ones to this paper). These papers consider
1Indeed, our proof shows that, even if the true distribution, the seller’s benchmark distribution
and each bidder’s are all ε-close to each other, it is possible that each bidder’s conditional belief
about the others’ values given his own value is precisely as constructed by Chung and Ely (2007).
In this sense, our result may be interpreted as showing that, even though the interim beliefs in
Chung and Ely (2007) cannot be consistent with an (exact) common prior, it can be consistent
with an approximate common prior.
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the situation where the agents’ beliefs can be arbitrarily different from each other
(and from the principal’s, if the principal has a prior). For example, Chung and Ely
(2007) identifies a type space with heterogeneous priors with which one of the optimal
Bayesian mechanisms is a dominant-strategy mechanism. Thus, if the seller has little
idea about the bidders’ beliefs, then the worst-case-minded seller has a justification
to offer a dominant-strategy mechanism. We show that, even if the seller has a much
better idea about the bidders’ beliefs in that their priors are arbitrarily close to each
other and also to the seller’s (and that being their common knowledge), essentially
the same conclusion is obtained. In this sense, our result strengthens that of Chung
and Ely (2007).
The local robustness (in various senses) has been studied in other papers. Ollár
and Penta (2017) propose a general form of restrictions directly on the agents’ in-
terim beliefs, and show that, when the set of possible interim beliefs are small in
an appropriate sense, much more permissive results are possible. Our result shows
that the ex ante belief restriction does not imply their interim restriction, and hence
they lead to very different results. Jehiel, Meyer-ter Vehn, and Moldovanu (2012)
consider a related notion of local uncertainty in terms of interim beliefs, but in a
generic multi-dimensional interdependent-value environment. They show that, if the
principal’s goal is to implement some belief-invariant social choice function, then the
same kind of an impossibility result is obtained as in Jehiel, ter Vehn, Moldovanu,
and Zame (2006) (where the latter paper considers ex post implementation, and in
this sense allows for global robustness). Our environment is with private values,
and the seller’s goal is revenue maximization rather than a social choice function
implementation.2
2Hence, in principle, the seller might find it optimal to use a mechanism that induces a highly
belief-dependent outcome. Put it differently, the set of feasible mechanisms in our case is larger
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In a single-agent environment, Madarász and Prat (2017) consider a situation
where the principal is aware that the true distribution of the agent’s type can be ε-
different from what the seller has in mind. Carroll (2017) generalizes their notion of
ε-closeness in the context of a (single-agent) multi-dimensional screening problem.3
As far as we are aware of, ours is the first paper that generalizes their notions of
closeness to a multi-agent environment. Importantly, with multiple agents, it is not
only the principal who is uncertain about the true distribution, but the agents enjoy
uncertainties about the true distributions and the others’ beliefs. On the other hand,
relative to Madarász and Prat (2017) and Carroll (2017), we focus on a single-good




A seller (she) wants to sell an indivisible good. There are N risk-neutral bidders
with private values. Each bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , N} knows his own valuation vi ∈ R. An
allocation is denoted by (q, p) = (qi, pi)
N
i=1, where qi ∈ [0, 1] denotes the probability
than those that implement a belief-invariant social choice function.
3See also Bergemann and Schlag (2005). Carroll and Meng (2019) considers the local robustness
in a single-agent moral-hzard environment.
4Madarász and Prat (2017) show that, with a single agent, a similar approximation result is
possible by their profit-participation mechanism even without single-crossing conditions. Its basic
idea is to make the agent “biased in favor of the principal” so that any (even non-local) deviation
due to misspecification only increases the principal’s payoff. With multiple agents, however, even if
an agent’s deviation makes the principal better off fixing the other agents’ behavior, it may further
trigger other agents’ further deviation which may make the principal worse off.
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that bidder i obtains the good, and pi ∈ R denotes his payment to the seller. An
allocation is feasible if
∑
i qi ≤ 1. Given (qi, pi), i’s payoff is given by viqi − pi.
We assume that the seller has his own “benchmark distribution” g for the bidders’
values v, which has a finite support. Note that g may exhibit arbitrary correlation.
As opposed to the standard exact-common-prior model where this g is assumed to
be exact common knowledge among the bidders (and also is treated as the true
prior), we assume that the seller is not fully certain about the true distribution
and the bidders’ knowledge, hence cautious in the sense made precise later. More
specifically, let f represent the true distribution for v with a finite support; and let hi
represent bidder i’s benchmark distribution for v with a finite support. In principle,
they are all different from each other, while we assume that they are close to each
other, in the spirit of Madarász and Prat (2017) and Carroll (2017):
Definition 1. Two distributions µ and µ̂ are ε-close to each other if V = supp(µ)
and V̂ = supp(µ̂) can be partitioned into disjoint measurable sets {V 1, ..., V r} and
{V̂ 1, ..., V̂ r} respectively such that, for each k ∈ {1, ..., r}:
1. µ(V k) = µ̂(V̂ k), and
2. d(v, v̂) ≤ ε for any (v, v̂) ∈ V k × V̂ k,
where d(v, s) represents the Euclidean distance between v and v̂.
A collection of distributions {µ1, . . . , µK} is ε-close to each other if any pair µi, µj
are ε-close to each other as above.
Example 1. We illustrate the closeness of two distributions in the following example.
Let g be the distribution represented as follows:
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Table 1: Distribution g
and let f be represented as follows:
f(v1, v2) v2 = 1− ε v2 = 1 v2 = 2− ε v2 = 2








Table 2: Distribution f
Then, according to the definition above, f and g are (ε
√
2)-close to each other.












Figure 2: Distribution f
The seller with g worries that any combination of f and each hi may be possible
8
as long as (f, g, h1, . . . , hN) are ε-close to each other in the above sense, and hence
evaluates his auction mechanism according to the worst-case scenario. We are inter-
ested in identifying the maximum expected revenue that can be guaranteed to the
seller, especially in the limit case with ε → 0.
Throughout the paper, we assume that g has a rectangular-shaped support (i.e.,
there exists Si ⊆ R for each i such that g(v) > 0 if and only if v ∈
∏N
i=1 Si), and
satisfies the single-crossing virtual value condition, as in Chung and Ely (2007). For
each i ̸= j and v, let γi(v) be i’s virtual valuation:








Assumption 1. For each i ̸= j, and each vi, v′i, v−i with v′i > vi:
γi(vi, v−i) ≥ 0 ⇒ γi(v′i, v−i) ≥ 0
γi(vi, v−i) ≥ γj(vi, v−i) ⇒ γi(v′i, v−i) ≥ γj(v′i, v−i).
As shown in Chung and Ely (2007), it is satisfied if g exhibits affiliation and
monotone hazard-rates.
2.2 Mechanism
An auction mechanism is represented by (M, q, p) = (Mi, qi, pi)
N
i=1, where: each Mi
is a set, M =
∏N
i=1Mi, qi : M → [0, 1] with
∑
i qi(m) ≤ 1 for all m ∈ M , and
pi : M → R. An interpretation is that, given mechanism (M, q, p), each bidder
is asked to simultaneously choose any mi ∈ Mi; and given the chosen vector m =
(m1, . . . ,mN) ∈ M , allocation (qi(m), pi(m))Ni=1 is executed. A feasible mechanism
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must contain some element ϕi ∈ Mi for each i such that qi(ϕi,m−i) = pi(ϕi,m−i) = 0
for any m−i ∈ M−i, representing the idea of i’s individual rationality requirement.
A mechanism’s performance depends on the adapted solution concept. We intro-
duce two solution concepts: One is based on dominant strategies, and the other is
based on Bayesian equilibrium.
Definition 2. Mechanism (M, q, p) admits a dominant-strategy equilibrium if there
exists σi(vi) for each i, vi ∈ R such that, for each mi,m−i:
viqi(σi(vi),m−i)− pi(σi(vi),m−i) ≥ viqi(mi,m−i)− pi(mi,m−i).
Mechanism Γ guarantees expected revenue R in dominant-strategy equilibrium in
g’s ε-neighborhood if, for any f that is ε-close to g, Γ admits a dominant-strategy








In order to define the other standard concept of Bayesian equilibrium, we need
further information about the bidders’ mutual beliefs (e.g., whether each bidder
knows other bidders’ benchmark beliefs, whether each bidder knows what other bid-
ders know about the others’ benchmark beliefs, and so on). Although there exist
many possible alternatives regarding the specification of the bidders’ mutual beliefs,
in this paper, we consider the simplest possible alternative. Namely, each bidder i
believes hi as his first-order belief, and that fact itself is common knowledge (i.e.,
trivial higher-order beliefs).5
5Our modeling choice may be justified as follows. First, even if one prefers other specifica-
tions, they would probably include this common-knowledge possibility as one of the possible sit-
uations; Second, as a related point, our approach would make the departure from the standard
exact-common-knowledge model minimal. Given that our result is basically a negative result, this




i=1 is common knowledge among the bidders, a Bayesian equilib-
rium in a mechanism is naturally defined as follows.
Definition 3. Mechanism Γ admits a Bayesian equilibrium given (hi)
N
i=1 if there
exists σi(vi) for each i, vi ∈ R such that, for each mi:∑
v−i




[viqi(mi, σ−i(v−i))− pi(mi, σ−i(v−i))]hi(vi, v−i).
Mechanism Γ guarantees expected revenue R in Bayesian equlibrium in g’s ε-
neighborhood if, for any (f, (hi)
N
i=1) such that (f, g, (hi)
N
i=1) are ε-close to each other,










Obviously, the revenue guarantee in dominant strategy equilibrium is weakly
lower than that in Bayesian equilibrium.
Recall that, in case g exhibits certain correlation (as specified in Crémer and
McLean (1988)) and ε = 0, the expected revenue in Bayesian equilibrium is very
different from that in dominant strategies. However, we show that, as long as ε
is strictly positive, no matter how small it is, the guaranteed revenue in Bayesian
equilibrium coincides with that in dominant strategies; and as ε vanishes, that guar-
anteed revenue converges to the dominant-strategy revenue with ε = 0 (but not to
the Bayesian equilibrium revenue with ε = 0).
3 Motivating example
We employ Example 1 to illustrate the seller’s revenue loss if she adopts the optimal
mechanism based on g, without taking into account the possibility of misspecification.
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We will show that the seller’s revenue loss does not vanish even when the model is
very close to the truth.
Assume that the seller’s benchmark distribution g is as illustrated in Table 1. If
the seller believes g without any worry about possible misspecifications, then as in
Crémer and McLean (1988), the optimal mechanism is a combination of a second-
price auction (SPA) and side-bets, which extracts the full surplus as his expected
revenue (5
3
). The following table corresponds to one such mechanism (it only shows
bidder 1’s allocation; bidder 2’s is symmetric):
(q1(v), t1(v)) v2 = 1 v2 = 2










v1 = 2 (1, 1− 13) (
1
2
, 1 + 2
3
)
Table 3: Outcomes from a SPA and side-bets
where the red parts in the transfers come from the side-bets. The seller obtains from




















. Similarly, the seller gets
5
6
from bidder 2. Hence, the total payment is 5
3
, which is exactly the ex-ante total
surplus.
Now consider the case where each bidder i’s prior hi is ε-close to but different from
g. One might conjecture that, if the above mechanism is appropriately perturbed
so that the bidders’ participation and incentive constraints are satisfied with strict
inequality (more specifically, with the strictness in the order of ε), then a similar level
of expected revenue is to be guaranteed. In particular, as ε → 0, that guaranteed
revenue converges to the full-surplus revenue again.
This conjecture is false. To explain the key idea, suppose that each bidder knows
the true prior f (i.e., h1 = . . . = hN = f), and it is given as in Table 2. Even though
f and g are ε-close to each other as priors, their induced conditional distributions,
12
that is, the bidders’ interim beliefs given their values, are very different. Given
f(= hi), bidder i with any vi essentially knows the other bidder’s value. Therefore,
in the above Cremer-McLean mechanism, truth-telling (or more precisely, reporting
the values closest to their true values) is no longer an equilibrium: For example, if
v1 = 1− ε, bidder 1 would prefer non-participation to reporting v1 = 1 and paying 1
without winning; similarly, if v1 = 2− ε, bidder 1 would prefer misreporting v1 = 1
to reporting v1 = 2. Notice that those deviations continues to be relevant even if the
mechanism is slightly perturbed. As an immediate consequence, the seller’s expected
revenue in this mechanism or its slight perturbation would be far below the first-best
surplus.
On the contrary, a (slightly perturbed) dominant-strategy mechanism is robust
with respect to the ε-misspecifications. For example, consider the following second-
price auction with slight perturbation: (again, it only shows bidder 1’s allocation;
bidder 2’s is symmetric):
(q1(v), t1(v)) v2 = 1 v2 = 2





− η) (0, 0)




Table 4: Outcomes from a perturbed SPA
η > 0 is the degree of transfer-reduction perturbation. Imagine the same f =
h1 = . . . = hN as in Table 2. This time, as far as ε < 2η, bidder 1 finds it dominant
to (participate and) report v1 = x if the true value is either x − ε or x. Therefore,
the seller’s expected revenue in this mechanism is close to the case with ε = 0, in
the sense that the difference of those two vanishes as ε → 0.
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4 Main result
Theorem 1. Let RDε (R
∗
ε, resp.) denote the maximum revenue guarantee in domi-










ε ̸= R∗0 whenever R∗0 > RD0 .
In order to prove the theorem, we first consider the relaxed environment where
the seller knows the true distribution, that is, f = g. He is still unsure about each











sub. to (f, (hi)i) are ε-close to each other
σ(v) is a BNE.
It is immediate that R
∗
ε ≥ R∗ε.
4.1 Seller with g = f
In order to characterize R
∗
ε, we first consider an auxiliary environment where the
seller knows g = f but each bidder i may have an arbitrary interim belief about the
other bidders’ values.
More specifically, fix i and vi, and let τi(·|vi) be a finite-support probability
distribution over v−i (i.e., τi(v−i|vi) ≥ 0 for each v−i and
∑
v−i
τi(v−i|vi) = 1). We call
τi(·|vi) bidder i’s interim belief for v−i given his value vi. Assuming that (τi(·|·))i is














[viqi(σi(vi), σ−i(v−i))− pi(σi(vi), σ−i(v−i))]τi(v−i|vi)∑
v−i
[viqi(mi, σ−i(v−i))− pi(mi, σ−i(v−i))]τi(v−i|vi), ∀i, vi,mi.
In fact, this auxiliary problem is in a sub-case of what Chung and Ely (2007)
study, and they show that the optimal revenue guarantee in Bayesian equilibrium
coincides with the best dominant-strategy revenue.
Proposition 1. (Chung and Ely (2007))






sub. to σ(v) is a DSE.
In our environment (with an additional assumption of g = f), each bidder’s
interim belief is potentially restricted by the requirement that hi is close to f and
each hj. In this sense, R ≤ R
∗
ε.
In fact, they coincide.
Theorem 2. R = RD0 = R
∗
ε.
The proof is in the appendix. Intuitively, this is established by showing that, even
if a prior hi is arbitrarily close to g = f , it is possible that each bidder’s interim
belief given his own valuation can have a large degree of freedom.
To be more precise, each hi is constructed so that its support supp(hi) comprises
two parts. First, the support of true f itself: supp(f). Second, a set of points
that are ε-close to (but different from) supp(f). The probabilities that hi assign on
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supp(f) are such that i’s conditional belief given vi is the same as what Chung and
Ely (2007) construct. The probabilities that hi assign for the other points are so
that hi is ε-close to f . Then, as a distribution, hi and f are close to each other, but
given that f is the true distribution, only those on supp(f) can actually happen, in
which case i’s belief is as in Chung and Ely (2007) construction.
4.2 Seller without g = f
Next, we show that, as ε vanishes, the revenue guarantee in dominant-strategy equi-











0 . Thus, Theorem 3 then implies Theorem 1.
Madarász and Prat (2017) show that, in a general single-agent mechanism design
environment, the same sort of continuity is obtained. That is, as the seller’s bench-
mark distribution converges to the true distribution, their optimal expected revenues
also converge. Our proof generalizes their result to a multi-agent environment, but
in a single-crossing payoff environment.
The key step of the proof is to construct what we call a transfer-reducing mech-
anism, an appropriately perturbed version of the optimal dominant-strategy mech-
anism under the assumption of g = f . Consider this latter optimal mechanism. It
typically satisfies some incentive constraints with equality (rather than with strict
inequality), and therefore, in case g ̸= f , and in particular, in case their supports
are (ε-)different, some bidders may find strictly optimal to make a type report that
is far from his true type.6 However, by reducing the transfers of the mechanism (by
6In Appendix, we observe that such a global deviation under misspecification is the norm rather
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an appropriate amount as a function of ε), the mechanism can now make all the
incentive constraints satisfied in a stronger sense, so that even if g and f have (ε-
)different supports, each agent finds it dominant to report the value that is closest to
his true value in that mechanism. Although the revenue must be smaller, as ε → 0,
this revenue loss vanishes.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we consider the private-value auction setting where the true distribu-
tion of bidders’ valuations is unknown. The seller and each bidder, however, know
its approximation. In this framework, we have shown that the dominant-strategy
mechanism secures the seller the highest revenue guarantee. Besides, if the seller is
restricted to use a dominant-strategy mechanism, we have characterized the “transfer
reducing mechanism” that helps the seller to obtain a vanishing loss as the estimates
by her and the bidders get close to the truth.
There are several follow-up questions. Firstly, when restricting to dominant-
strategy mechanisms, our proof works only if the bidders’ payoff functions satisfy the
single-crossing condition. Although this property holds for a wide range of mecha-
nism design problems, there are the cases where it does not hold, such as multi-unit
auctions. In such situations, our proposed mechanism may not work.
Another natural direction is to characterize the optimal robust mechanisms in
the settings without transfers (e.g., voting) or with common values. We leave these
potential extensions for future research.
than the exception.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
Let us recall the construction Chung and Ely (2007) consider in establishing R = RD0 .
For each i and vi, let τ
CE
i (v−i|vi) be his interim belief about v−i given his value type








Chung and Ely (2007) consider the bidders’ type space such that each i’s interim
belief is given as above, and that fact itself is common knowledge among the bidders.7
Chung and Ely (2007) show that, in the sup-inf problem of R, the above τCE is the
right interim belief, and the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism is (at least one
of) the optimal mechanism given τCE.
We now construct hi, i’s prior over the valuation profile, such that each agent i’s




, coincides with τCEi (v−i|vi).
For each i, let Vi = {vi|∃v−i, f(vi, v−i) > 0} denote the set of i’s possible values
in the true distribution f , and denote it by Vi = {v1i , . . . , vMi } so that vmi < vm+1i .
Define V̂i = {vi + ε|vi ∈ Vi} be the “shifted” version of Vi by ε. Also, we denote
V−i = {vk−i, v−i2, ..., v−iK}, without any ordering on them (i.e., arbitrary labeling will












7As is implied by other results in Chung and Ely (2007), in general, this type space cannot be a
common-prior type space (i.e., a type space such that there is a probability distribution over that
type space, and each player’s interim belief given his type is induced by that distribution by a Bayes
rule). In this viewpoint, our result may be interpreted as showing that, even though it cannot be
an “exact” common-prior type space, it can nevertheless be an “approximate-common-prior” type
space.
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(recall vmi ∈ Vi), and
hi(v
m






−i)− hi(vmi , vk−i)




























































































































First, the choice of xi guarantees that hi(v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ (Vi ∪ V̂i) × V−i. It
is also immediate that hi and f are ε-close to each other, because hi(v
m









Finally, we show that each bidder i’s interim belief is the same as in Chung and
Ely (2007). Let v be any element such that f(v) > 0. For bidder i with prior hi,
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−i|vmi ) = 1.
B Global deviation in optimal dominant-strategy
mechanisms with a misspecified support.
Recall the standard properties of the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism under
the assumption that g = f :
1. All the local downward IC constraints bind, i.e, for any k ≥ 2, any v̂−i, and
any sk ∈ supp(S):
skq(, v̂−i)− t(sk, v̂−i) = skq(sk−1, v̂−i)− t(sk−1, v̂−i)
where sk−1 = max{s ∈ supp(S) | s < sk}.
2. Allocation is monotone, i.e: qi(s
k, v−i) ≤ qi(sk
′
, v−i) if k < k
′.
If it is possible that f and g are (ε-close to but) different from each other, then
global deviations would typically be relevant.
Proposition 2. Fix ε and g. There exists f that is ε-close to g such that a bidder
finds it optimal to not report the value that is closest to his true valuation.
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Proof. Let V = supp(f) and S = supp(g). For a bidder i with value close to and
smaller than sk (i.e, vi = s
k − ε), he prefers to report that his value is sk−1, rather
than sk. This is because:
(sk − ε)q(sk, v̂−i)− t(sk, v̂−i) = skq(sk, v̂−i)− t(sk, v̂−i)− εq(sk, v̂−i)
= skq(sk−1, v̂−i)− t(sk−1, v̂−i)− εq(sk, v̂−i)
< skq(sk−1, v̂−i)− t(sk−1, v̂−i)− εq(sk−1, v̂−i)
= (sk − ε)q(sk−1, v̂−i)− t(sk−1, v̂−i)
The second equality comes from the fact that local ICk,k−1 constraint binds. The
inequality is because of monotone allocation rule.
Similarly, for a bidder i with value close to and larger than sk (i.e, vi = s
k + ε),
he prefers to report that his value is sk−1, rather than sk. This is because:
(sk + ε)q(sk−1, v̂−i)− t(sk−1, v̂−i) = skq(sk−1, v̂−i)− t(sk−1, v̂−i) + εq(sk−1, v̂−i)
= skq(sk, v̂−i)− t(sk, v̂−i) + εq(sk−1, v̂−i)
> skq(sk, v̂−i)− t(sk, v̂−i)
C Proof of Theorem 3
Let (q∗(·), t∗(·)) represent the optimal dominant-strategy mechanism under the as-
sumption that g = f . Let V = supp(g), and let Vi = {vi ∈ R|∃v−i; (vi, v−i) ∈ V }
denote its i-th coordinate.
Fix δ > 0. The δ-transfer reduction mechanism of (q∗(·), t∗(·)) has the same mes-
sage space and the winning-probability function as the optimal dominant-strategy
mechanism, but the price is smaller by δ.
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For each vi ∈ Vi, truth-telling is still dominant-strategy incentive compatible, but
now in a stronger sense. More specifically, for any v′i ∈ Vi with v′i < vi and any v−i:
viq
∗
i (v)− (t∗i (v)− q∗i (v)δ) ≥ viq∗i (v′i, v−i)− (t∗i (v′i, v−i)− q∗i (v′i, v−i)δ),




i, v−i). This is because of the
original incentive compatibility, viq
∗
i (v) − t∗i (v) ≥ viq∗i (v′i, v−i) − t∗i (v′i, v−i), and the
single-crossing property. This implies that, if bidder i’s true value v̂i satisfies v̂i ≥
vi − δ, he prefers reporting vi to v′i.




i (v)− (t∗i (v)− q∗i (v)δ) ≥ viq∗i (v′i, v−i)− (t∗i (v′i, v−i)− q∗i (v′i, v−i)δ),




i, v−i). This is again by the
original incentive compatibility and the single-crossing property. This implies that,
if bidder i’s true value v̂i satisfies v̂i ≤ vi + δ with sufficiently small δ, he prefers
reporting vi to v
′
i.
To conclude, for bidder i whose value is δ-close to vi ∈ Vi, it is dominant for him
to report vi in the δ-transfer-reduction mechanism. We take δ = ε then. Although
we omit the detail, it can also be shown that his ex post individual rationality is
satisfied.
By construction, the ε-transfer-reduction mechanism collects the same amount of
transfer from each type of each agent less at most ε. Therefore, if g = f , then the
expected revenue in the ε-transfer-reduction mechanism, denoted by R′ε(g), is not
lower than RD0 −Nε:
R′ε(g) ≥ RD0 −Nε.
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If f is different from g, it remains true that each bidder with each type finds
it dominant to report his closest type in the same ε-transfer-reduction mechanism.
Therefore, denoting by R′ε(f) the expected revenue of the same ε-transfer-reduction








f |ε-close to g
R′ε(f)| = 0,
By definition, recall:
RD0 ≥ RDε ≥ inf
f |ε-close to g
R′ε(f)
Therefore:
0 ≤ RD0 −RDε ≤ R′ε(g) +Nε− inf
f |ε-close to g
R′ε(f),
where the right-hand side converges to 0 as ε → 0.
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